priority in application to the complex. Both the ad hoc generalisations from personal feelings and experiences as well as the highly structured, refined models can be called into question if they fail to be predictive of the behaviour of simple cases. Thus we claim that our simple laboratory markets can be used as a screen to remove some of the competing ideas. Extension of the above line ofjustification leads naturally to an examination of the 'corrective measures' found in the academic and policy-related literature. What are the comparative performances of policies in the simple cases? Perhaps from the simple cases we can get some ideas about relative performance in the complex cases.
The three policy measures we examine are the 'tax/bribe' approach, the 'standards' approach, and the 'pollution licence' approach. These are structured in the experiments so that the information available for policy purposes is roughly comparable in all cases. Individual demands and costs are assumed to be unavailable (except for distribution of income considerations) but the optimum pollution quantity is known for the license policy and the standards policy. Marginal social cost at the optimum is known for the tax policy.
The standards approach is the one found most frequently in application. The current air pollution policies are a good case in point. For example, standard welfare economics arguments lead to the conclusion that the area ABCD on Fig. 2 is the 'optimum' value of pollution damage. The 'standards' approach to policy is to translate the value into a legal standard governing the amount of admissible pollution. In this case the policy is to adopt the standard that pollution will be limited to the quantity which constrains damage value to ABCD. Naturally this effectively limits the quantity of Q to the quantity QO which must be rationed among demanders and suppliers. Individual demands [ and costs are assumed to be unknown to the policy maker so they cannot be used directly as part of the policy. The second policy is the pollution tax.' The amount of the marginal social cost calculated at the optimum quantity, QO, is imposed as a per unit tax over all units. Tax revenues are then redistributed back to the population in some manner. On Fig. 2 this is the distance BC. When the amount BC is imposed as a per unit tax, the new supply curve is the dotted line marked 'private cost + tax supply'. The market price would be Pe and the equilibrium quantity would be the optimum Q,.
The third policy involves the distribution of licences (rights) to pollute. Only those who have acquired a licence may engage in the pollution-creating activity, which in the case discussed above is the purchase or sale of the commodity. If only QO licences exist, and if a separate licence must be held by the seller for each unit sold, and if the licences are marketable, then the price of the licence should equilibrate at the level BC. The market price of the primary commodity Q, should be Pe, the quantity should be the optimum QO and the licences should be held by the low cost sellers of Q.
The experiments reported below provide some experience against which these policies can be gauged. Three different dimensions are considered. The first is the price behaviour; the second is efficiency; and the last involves the distributional consequences. Student subjects were recruited from California State University at Los Angeles and Los Angeles City College through announcements made in classes. The markets with licences were conducted with Caltech students, many of whom had previous experience in experimental markets. All other subjects had no experience in experimental markets and all subjects participated in only one of the experiments reported here. Participants were told that they would be paid but the amount would vary depending on the decisions they made. They were also told the amount would likely be more than the hourly wage and that we had never had a complaint. Once the students were assembled the instructions, included in the appendices, were read. After all questions were answered and a period 'zero' was run on a 'trial basis' without compensation, the experiment was begun.' Each market had six buyers and six sellers. Limit prices were induced for the multiple unit trading case using the format developed by Plott and Smith (I 978) . Each individual buyer (seller) was given a redemption (cost) schedule which indicated the amount the experimenter would pay (charge) him for each unit purchased (sold) during a period. The differences between these limit prices and the price at which he purchased (sold) the unit was his to keep. Each subject was also paid a commission of five cents for each trade he made during the period. In addition to the limit prices, each subject was given a damage schedule indicating how much his profits from trades would be reduced as a function of the total number of trades in the market. This latter feature is the ' externality.' Each individual hurts all other individuals whenever he engages in trade and is hurt whenever anyone else engages in trade. Since this latter feature means that profit after damages can be negative and thus in violation of our contracts with the subject, each subject is given a capital payment each period as shown on for the first to ninth units respectively. All individuals had the same limit price schedule for all periods. Since the limit prices are unaffected by the capital payments, the latter are not shown on the figure. The market equilibrium quantity is twenty-four units and the price is $2.44. The optimum quantity is thirteen units. All markets were organised as oral double auction markets as described in the instructions in the appendices. All bids (offers) and contracts were written on the blackboard and remained there throughout the experiment.
A total of eight experimental sessions are reported and are categorised as follows. Experimental sessions one and two are markets with no corrective policies. These are simply oral double auctions in which each subject is aware of the externality damage (s)he is individually experiencing with each trade in the market. Sessions three and four are markets with the 'tax' policy. These are exactly as sessions one and two except the optimal tax has been imposed on sellers as an inescapable cost. Sessions five and six are markets with the policy standard. The experimental procedures of sessions one and two are again replicated, only market volume is limited to the optimal thirteen units on a first come, first served basis. Sessions seven and eight are the markets with pollution licences. Thirteen licences were distributed among subjects, which could be resold in an organised licence market. The sale of a unit in the primary market could only be made by a seller who had acquired a licence (one licence per unit) to make the sale. Sessions three and four had an additional feature not covered above. As is the case with tax policies in general, a decision had to be made concerning the disposition of tax revenues. Here we chose the option of returning it to the agents by means of lump-sum grants and an expected balanced budget. Total grants equalled the tax revenue predicted by the competitive model. Each person was paid the individual loss theoretically resulting from the tax, plus an equal share of the social gains which would theoretically result from the policy. These calculations are all reflected in the capital payments listed in Table I. A special feature of the instructions was very important for sessions five and six. Ties on bids, offers, and acceptances were broken by a random process. Each subject had a card with his/her buyer (seller) number on it. Those subjects involved in a tie held up their cards and the experimenter used a random number table to resolve the conflict. In the case of the pollution standard almost every action involved ties throughout the entire session.
Sessions seven and eight also had special instructional provisions because two markets rather than one were involved. Appendix 4 makes clear the appropriate modifications. Both markets were oral double auction markets conducted simultaneously so a participant could purchase a licence and immediately make a sale in the primary market.
1 An additional six experimental sessions were conducted but were discarded for various reasons having to do with 'contaminated' experimental settings. The results of the discarded experiments and the reasons for not including them with the experiments reported here may be obtained from the author.
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II. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS (A) Supply and Demand in Markets with Externalities
The time series resulting from sessions one and two are shown on Figs. 4 and 5. The predicted equilibrium price is $2.44 and the predicted quantity sold is twenty-four. As can be seen, the prices are near but below the predicted price. Average prices in the last two periods range from $2.4I8 to $2.434 within a 2.2 cent range of the predicted equilibrium. The quantity sold is twenty-four for three of these periods and twenty-six for the other (period four of session one), almost twice as much as the social optimum. We conclude that the existence of the externality had no effect on the market behaviour. That is, the market behaved as predicted by the direct application of the law of supply and demand. People were aware of the effects of their actions on others but this made no perceptible difference in behaviour. The slight deviation away from the predicted price is well within the margin of error one expects from market models especially when the net trading advantage is small.'
B. Comparative Performance of Corrective Policies
The three corrective policies, the tax, the standard and licences are compared along three different dimensions. First, the price and quantity behaviour are compared. Second, the efficiency of all three are examined, and finally the distributional effects of the policies will be discussed.
B. i. Price and Quantity Behaviour
The price and quantity results for the tax policy are shown on Figs. 6 and 7. Average price in the final period is less than $o.oi from the predicted price in one experiment and was exactly the predicted price in the other. Volume was one unit more than predicted in one and exactly as predicted in the other. The accuracy of the model in predicting the price and quantity behaviour in sessions three and four was to be expected in light of the results of sessions one and two. Once we know that the law of supply and demand applies to markets with externalities, the imposition of a tax simply becomes a change in supply as shown on Fig. 2 . In this sense sessions three and four can be viewed as replications of sessions one and two.
The case of a policy standard is much different. The total number of trades is restricted to thirteen by the limitation on allowable 'pollution' damage. The ' optimum' quantity of pollution damage as calculated is compatible with only thirteen trades. Since trading activity is limited to the first thirteen contracts, subjects hurry to make bids (offers) and/or agree to any offers (bids) they find acceptable. This results in multiple-person ties both at the bid (offer) stage and the acceptance stage. These ties were resolved by a random number table.
The time series shown on Figs. 8 and 9 reflect the tendency for sellers (buyers), once given access to the 'trading floor', to make an offer (bid) at a high (low) 
B. 2. Efficiency
The trading patterns which emerge from these markets are Pareto optimal if and only if the total earning of the subjects is maximised. This occurs only in case the volume is thirteen units; all units sold have limit prices of $2.33 or less; and, the limit price of every unit purchased is no lower than $2.69. The efficiency is defined to be total earnings divided by total earnings possible (omitting commission). If the value of the external diseconomy is greater than the private gains from trading, total earnings can be negative, so the efficiency measure can be negative as it sometimes is.
The efficiency measures for each session are shown on Table 2 . Least efficient of the modes of organisation are the unregulated externality cases. The most efficient mode of organisation was the licence policy. The differences in efficiency are significant except perhaps for the differences between the tax policy and the licence policy. For example, the average efficiency levels for periods other than the first two are -44.5 %, 34.4 %, 93.3 %, and 98-3 % for the no policy, policy standard, tax policy, and licence policy respectively.
The comparison between the licence policy and the tax policy should be qualified by the fact that many participants under the licence policy were experienced in laboratory market processes while those in the tax policy were totally inexperienced. Support exists (Smith and Williams, forthcoming) for the hypothesis that experience facilitates more rapid convergence. Of course the licence markets were more complicated in the sense that two markets were operating and subjects could be on both sides of the licence market as speculators.
A word of caution is in order about the interpretation of these efficiency numbers and the use of efficiency concepts in laboratory markets in general. The degree of inefficiency which results from a process is probably sensitive to the structure of demand and supply. In these experiments there were several participants who were excluded from the market by just a few cents if the market attained a competitive equilibrium. Any process which leads to a high variance in prices will give such 'marginal' traders a chance to trade a unit or so each, and each such trade reduces market efficiency. If these extra-marginal units were controlled by a single subject who, by virtue of being a single trader, had fewer opportunities to trade, the efficiencies may have been elevated. In Table 2 Efficiency Percentages addition, the efficiency of a licence policy might be affected by the initial distribution of licences by placing them in the 'right hands' initially. In these markets the maximum efficiency would have been 46 % had trading in licences been prohibited.
B. 3. Distribution
Subject earnings were determined by trading activity and capital payments. The latter, as explained above, were provided according to the experimenter's estimate (based on the hypothesis that the law of supply and demand works) of income due to trading. Thus individuals with poor limit prices were provided with high capital payments. The design was calculated to keep incomes for an experimental session in the 'no policy' case in the five dollar range for each subject (about $i per period for five periods).
In the pollution tax case tax revenues were estimated and redistributed to participants as part of the capital payments. Thus capital payments to participants in the tax case are about $0. I 7 per period higher than in the 'no policy' case. Incomes in the pollution licence experiments depended upon trading activity, capital payments, and licence holdings. Capital payments in the licence experiments are the same as those in the 'no policy' case. Licences were initially distributed so that the ultimate income distribution predicted by the
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competitive model would be as close as possible to the predicted distribution in the tax case. The average income for the final periods of each session is shown in Table 3 along with the predicted values. Comparing income distributions averaged over the two experiments yields near unanimity of preference for any policy over no policy. Application of simple majority rule leads to the relation: standard beats licence (6 to 5), licence beats tax (8 to 4), and tax ties standard (6 to 6). Thus the standard policy is the core of a majority rule game and would be chosen by a majority from this set of policies given these parameters even though it is the least efficient of the three policies. 
General
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash. In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which some of you will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, labelled Buyer or Seller, which describes the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
Speciic irnstructions to buyers
During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers as many units as you might want. For the first unit that you buy during a trading period you will receive the amount listed in row (i) marked 1st unit redemption value; if you buy a second unit you will receive the additional amount listed in row (5) marked 2nd unit redemption value, etc. The profits from each purchase (which are, after damages, yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the redemption value and purchase price of the unit bought. Under no conditions may you buy a unit for a price which exceeds the redemption value. In addition to this profit you will receive a 5 cent commission for each purchase. That is, If you are a seller in the P-market and wish to use one of your licences for a sale in the P-market, record a sale (to yourself) on the Information and Record Sheet for the L-market. Enter a price under the Sale column and adjust the inventory total downward. The price should also be entered as a cost in the P-market record sheet. You might notice that the price you record makes no difference to your profits because the revenue recorded on one sheet is exactly offset by the cost recorded on the other.
Profits at the end of the period should be calculated on the last line. Record end-of-period profits on the Profit Sheet.
